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Abstract
Over the past two decades, formal methods researchers have produced a number of powerful soft-
ware tools designed to detect errors in, and to verify properties of, hardware designs, software
systems, and software system artifacts. Mostly used in the past to debug hardware designs, in
future years, these tools should help developers improve the quality of software systems. They
should be especially useful in developing high assurance software systems, where compelling ev-
idence is required that the system satisﬁes critical properties, such as safety and security. This
paper describes the diﬀerent roles that formally based software tools can play in improving the cor-
rectness of software and software artifacts. Such tools can help developers manage complexity by
automatically exposing certain classes of software errors and by producing evidence (e.g., mechan-
ically checked proofs, results of executing automatically generated test cases, etc.) that a software
system satisﬁes its requirements. In addition, the tools allow practitioners to focus on development
tasks best performed by people—e.g., obtaining and validating requirements and constructing a
high-quality requirements speciﬁcation.
Keywords: formal methods, software tools, formal speciﬁcation, formal veriﬁcation, model
checking, theorem proving, SCR.
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, our research group at NRL has developed a formal
state-machine semantics and a set of formally based tools to support re-
quirements speciﬁcation in the SCR (Software Cost Reduction) tabular no-
tation [14,15,16,17]. The SCR notation has been used by a number of or-
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ganizations in industry to develop and analyze requirements speciﬁcations
of practical systems, including ﬂight control systems, weapons systems, and
space systems. For example, in 2001, Lockheed Martin used the SCR nota-
tion as well as the SCR tools, together with a test case generator, to detect
a critical error described as the “most likely cause” of a $165M failure in the
software controlling landing procedures in the Mars Polar Lander [5].
Our target systems are high assurance software systems, such as avionics
systems, safety-critical software for medical devices, and control systems for
nuclear power plants, where compelling evidence is required that the system
satisﬁes a set of critical properties. Among these properties are
• security properties (the system prevents the unauthorized disclosure and
modiﬁcation of sensitive information, denial of service, unauthorized intru-
sions, and other malicious actions),
• safety properties (the system prevents unintended events that could result
in death, injury, illness, or property damage),
• fault-tolerant properties (the system guarantees a certain quality of service
despite faults, such as hardware, workload, or environmental anomalies),
• survivability properties (the system continues to fulﬁll its mission in the
presence of attacks, accidents, or failures), and
• real-time properties (the system delivers its outputs within speciﬁed time
intervals).
Two high assurance systems currently under investigation by our group are
CD, a cryptographic device for use in U. S. Navy systems, and the FPE (Fault
Protection Engine), a safety-critical software component of NASA spacecraft.
CD is a member of a family of software-based devices that will provide cryp-
tographic processing of data stored on several diﬀerent channels, each channel
associated with a diﬀerent host system. Because data on diﬀerent channels
may have diﬀerent security classiﬁcations, CD must enforce data separation,
i.e., ensure that data on one channel cannot inﬂuence, nor be inﬂuenced by,
data on a diﬀerent channel. We are currently developing a plan for formally
specifying and verifying that the CD software, which uses a separation ker-
nel [24] to mediate access to data, enforces data separation.
The FPE is a complex, safety-critical software component of current NASA
spacecraft, a version of which will also be used in future spacecraft. The FPE’s
function is to monitor the health of the spacecraft’s software and hardware and
to coordinate and track responses to detected faults [8]. Because the FPE’s
function is crucial to the successful operation of the spacecraft, NASA needs
high assurance that the FPE has been correctly implemented. To evaluate the
correctness of the FPE implementation, NRL has developed a formal speciﬁ-
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cation of the most complex part of the FPE and a suite of test cases, derived
automatically from the FPE speciﬁcation, for evaluating the FPE software.
The test cases were constructed using the algorithm described in [9].
Described below are 1) six classes of tools useful in constructing these and
other high assurance software systems and components and 2) some areas
in which such tools need improvement. In addition, an important aspect of
developing a high assurance software system is discussed that is minimally de-
pendent on tool support but is necessary for most tools to be eﬀective. Despite
its importance, this aspect—the construction of a high quality speciﬁcation
of the required behavior of a system or software component—has been largely
ignored both by software engineering researchers and by software developers.
2 On the Role of Tools
Tools can play an important role in obtaining high conﬁdence that a software
system satisﬁes critical properties. Described below are six diﬀerent roles that
tools can play in improving the quality of both software systems and software
system artifacts.
2.1 Demonstrate well-formedness
A well-formed speciﬁcation is syntactically and type correct, has no circular
dependencies, and is complete (no required behavior is missing) and consis-
tent (no behavior in the speciﬁcation is ambiguous). Tools, such as NRL’s
consistency checker [15], can automatically detect well-formedness errors. Ref-
erences [15] and [22] describe how a consistency checker found missing cases
and ambiguity in the speciﬁcations of both an avionics system and a ﬂight
guidance system. In both cases, the checker automatically detected serious
errors overlooked by human inspections.
2.2 Discover property violations
In many cases, using a tool, such as a model checker, to analyze a system
speciﬁcation for some critical property uncovers a violation of the property.
Given diagnostic information, such as a counterexample returned by the model
checker, the developer may ﬁnd a ﬂaw in the speciﬁcation or one or more
missing assumptions. Alternatively, the formulation of the property, rather
than the speciﬁcation, may be incorrect. In all of these cases, the result of
analysis can be extremely valuable. Reference [16] how model checking was
used to detect a safety property violation in a contractor speciﬁcation of a
weapons control system. Recently, some researchers have begun using model
C. Heitmeyer / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 108 (2004) 11–19 13
checking to detect property violations in software, rather than in software
speciﬁcations. One notable example is Ball and Rajamani’s SLAM project
which uses software model checking to detect bugs in device drivers [2]. The
result of SLAM’s successful use of model checking to detect serious software
bugs has led Microsoft to fund the development of a production-quality tool
that will use the techniques pioneered in SLAM to detect bugs in device drivers
and other similar programs.
2.3 Verify critical properties
Either a theorem prover or a model checker may be used to verify that a
software artifact, such as a requirements speciﬁcation or a design speciﬁcation,
satisﬁes a critical property. For example, [21] describes the use of a theorem
prover to verify that an early speciﬁcation of CD satisﬁes a set of critical
security properties.
2.4 Validate a speciﬁcation
A developer or domain expert may use a tool, such as a simulator or animator,
to check that a formal speciﬁcation captures the intended system behavior.
By running scenarios through a simulator, the user can ensure that the system
speciﬁcation neither omits nor incorrectly speciﬁes the system requirements.
In developing the FPE speciﬁcation, for example, simulation was not only
extremely valuable in debugging the speciﬁcation, but also proved useful in
obtaining feedback from domain experts about the required behavior, and in
demonstrating the behavior captured by the FPE speciﬁcation to the project
sponsors.
2.5 Construct test cases
From a formal speciﬁcation, a test case generator can automatically derive
a suite of test cases satisfying some coverage criterion, such as branch cov-
erage [9]. In speciﬁcations expressed in either SCR or RSML (Requirements
State Machine Language) [12], a requirements language inspired by State-
charts, the value of each dependent variable in the speciﬁcation is deﬁned
by a total function. In branch coverage, each part (i.e., branch) of each of
these function deﬁnitions forms the basis for constructing a test case. Taken
together, the suite of test cases constructed in this manner “cover” every con-
dition (i.e., branch) in the speciﬁcation. In the FPE project as well as other
projects involving high assurance systems, automated test case generation is
of high interest to software developers because 1) the cost of automatically
constructed tests is much lower than the cost of manually constructed tests,
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and 2) a set of test cases that “covers” the speciﬁcation can provide greater
conﬁdence in the correctness of the software than a set of test cases developed
in an ad hoc manner.
2.6 Detect coding errors and code vulnerabilities
A static analysis tool can analyze a piece of software without executing it.
Such tools can automatically detect errors and vulnerabilities, such as unini-
tialized variables, erroneous pointers, and arithmetic and buﬀer overﬂows, in
both source and assembler code. Examples of tools that help detect errors of
this class in C code include Codesurfer [6] and Safer C, which ﬁnds dangerous
vulnerabilities in code, such as those described in [11]. Bishop et al. describe
how static analysis tools can help uncover vulnerabilities in the COTS software
used in many safety-critical systems [4].
3 Needed Tool Improvements
Although tools can be enormously useful in debugging, and in producing ev-
idence of correctness of, software and software artifacts, a number of tool
improvements are urgently needed. These improvements, some previously
recommended in [13], are described below.
3.1 Automated Abstraction
Before practical software speciﬁcations can be model checked eﬃciently, the
state explosion problem must be addressed—i.e., the size of the state space to
be analyzed must be reduced. An eﬀective way to reduce state explosion is
to apply abstraction. For example, model checking the large speciﬁcation of
a weapons control system [16] did not succeed until two kinds of abstraction
were applied. Unfortunately, the most common approach is to develop the
abstraction in ad hoc ways—the correspondence between the abstraction and
the original speciﬁcation is based on informal, intuitive arguments. Needed
are mathematically sound abstractions that can be constructed automatically.
Recent progress in automatically constructing sound abstractions has been
reported in [3,16].
3.2 Understandable Feedback
When formal analysis exposes an error, the user should be provided with
easy-to-understand feedback useful in correcting the error. Techniques for
achieving this in consistency checking already exist (see, e.g., [18]). Although
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counterexamples produced by model checkers often provide useful diagnostic
information, they are sometimes hard to understand. One promising approach
uses a simulator or animator to demonstrate and validate a counterexample.
3.3 Automatically Generated Invariants
Tools, such as the one described in [19], are needed that can automatically
construct invariants from a speciﬁcation. Known invariants have many uses
in software development. They can be used as auxiliary lemmas in proving
theorems about the software speciﬁcation. For example, some of the security
properties to be proven about an early CD speciﬁcation [21] could not be
proved without auxiliary invariants. These invariants were automatically gen-
erated using the algorithms described in [19,20]. Invariants can also be used
in validating a requirements speciﬁcation—domain experts can use automat-
ically generated invariants to determine whether the speciﬁcation correctly
captures certain required system behavior.
3.4 More “Usable” Mechanical Theorem Provers
Although mechanical theorem provers have been used by researchers to verify
various algorithms and protocols, they are rarely used in practical software
development. For provers to be used more widely, a number of barriers need to
be overcome. First, the speciﬁcation languages provided by the provers must
be more natural. Second, the reasoning steps supported by a prover should be
closer to the steps produced in a hand proof; current provers support reasoning
steps that are at too low and detailed a level. One partial solution to this
problem is to build a prover front-end designed to support speciﬁcation and
proofs for a special class of mathematical models. An example of such a front-
end is TAME, a “natural” user interface to PVS [25] that is designed to specify
and prove properties about automata models [1]. Although using a mechanical
prover will still require mathematical maturity and theorem proving skills,
making the prover more “natural” and convenient to use should encourage
more widespread usage.
4 What Else Is Needed for Eﬀective Use of Tools?
While researchers (and many software developers) usually expend signiﬁcant
eﬀort applying tools, they often exert much less eﬀort and pay much less atten-
tion to creating a high-quality system speciﬁcation. As a result, many current
speciﬁcations are diﬃcult to understand and change and are also poorly orga-
nized. Urgently needed are higher quality speciﬁcations of requirements and
C. Heitmeyer / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 108 (2004) 11–1916
software designs. Such speciﬁcations are critically important because they
serve as a medium for precise communication between the customers, the de-
velopers, the veriﬁcation team, and other stakeholders.
One way to improve the quality of speciﬁcations is to choose a “good” spec-
iﬁcation language. This language must be “natural”; to the extent feasible, a
language syntax and semantics familiar to the software practitioner should be
supported. The language must also have an explicitly deﬁned formal seman-
tics, and it should scale. Moreover, well thought-out example speciﬁcations
expressed in the language should be available to practitioners. By studying
such examples, practitioners can learn how the language may be used to create
speciﬁcations that are both concise and easy to understand.
Our group and others (see, e.g., [7,5]) have successfully applied the SCR
tabular notation to express the required behavior of a number of software
systems and software components. The precise meaning of SCR speciﬁcations
is given by the state-machine semantics described in [15]. Others, such as
Heimdahl and Leveson [12], have proposed a hybrid notation that combines
tables and graphics.
Table-based speciﬁcation languages have many advantages. Not only are
tabular speciﬁcations easy to understand and (relatively) easy for software
practitioners to construct, in addition, tables provide a precise, unambiguous
basis for communication among practitioners. They also provide a natural or-
ganization which permits independent construction, review, modiﬁcation, and
analysis of smaller parts of a large speciﬁcation. Finally, tabular notations
scale. Evidence of the scalability of tabular speciﬁcations was demonstrated
in the early 1990s when Lockheed engineers, used a set of tables to spec-
ify the complete requirements of the C-130J Flight Program [7], a program
containing over 250K lines of Ada code. In addition to tabular notations,
other user-friendly notations should be explored. For example, a number of
researchers and practitioners capture system requirements using scenarios rep-
resented as Message Sequence Charts (MSCs), a notation commonly used to
describe communication protocols. Requirements represented by MSCs can be
analyzed either directly (see, e.g., [23]) or translated to another representation
for analysis as in [26].
Even if a good speciﬁcation language is chosen, a high quality speciﬁcation
still requires great care and skill on the part of the speciﬁer. Building a good
speciﬁcation is somewhat analogous to designing a good proof. Like a good
proof, such a speciﬁcation should be easy to understand. It should also, for
the most part, be free of redundancy, although some planned redundancy is
acceptable (e.g., a list of critical system properties). Reduction of redundancy
produces a more concise speciﬁcation, an important attribute of speciﬁcations
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of large, complex systems. Moreover, the speciﬁcation should be carefully
organized both for ease of understanding and for ease of change. Finally, a
good speciﬁcation should be a reference document, so that information in the
speciﬁcation is easy to ﬁnd.
5 Conclusion
Tools can be enormously useful in building high assurance software systems.
They can ﬁnd errors that human inspections miss, help validate a speciﬁcation,
provide mechanized support for verifying properties, reduce the time and eﬀort
required to construct (and execute) a set of test cases, and provide more
conﬁdence in the results of testing by constructing a suite of test cases based
on some coverage criterion. Thus, a set of powerful tools can liberate people to
do the hard intellectual work required to produce high quality, high assurance
software systems. Part of this intellectual eﬀort should be channeled into the
acquisition of knowledge of the system and software requirements and into the
production of easy-to-understand, well organized requirements speciﬁcations.
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